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ARTICLES
THE ONE AND THE MANY-THE
EXPROPRIATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY BY THE STATES:
COPYRIGHT AND THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
John M. DiJoseph*
The enigma of the One and the Many has vexed philosophers from
Plato to the present day. The One and the Many refers to the interplay
between a unitary being and its "other," a plurality of beings. The root
of the enigma is the conflict between the two beings as each tries to domi-
nate its "other." The enigma extends to the political manifestation of the
One and the Many; the conflict between ruler and ruled, or between a
unitary political entity and multiple entities. The ubiquitous and seem-
ingly intractable issue of states' rights is a paradigm of the enigma of the
One and the Many.'
The conflict over states' rights has raised the specter of the expropri-
ation of intellectual property rights by the Many, the states. The progen-
itor of the current crisis are recent court decisions including, inter alia,
Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford University.2 In Anderson,
Richard Anderson brought suit against Deborah Brown, the Publica-
tions Director of Radford University, alleging contributory infringe-
* Member of the Virgnia Bar and the United States Supreme Court Bar. George Mason
University (M.A.); Catholic University (Ph.D. in Philosophy and Politics expected). The au-
thor is a trial attorney specializing in copyright, personal injury, civil rights, and constitutional
law. Mr. DiJoseph represents Richard Anderson Photography against Radford University,
the leading case involving the relationship between copyright and the eleventh amendment,
now before the United States Supreme Court.
1. See PAUL WEISS, TOWARD A PERFECTED STATE 284-87 (1985). See also PAUL
WEISS, MODES OF BEING (1964).
2. 633 F. SUpp. 1354 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 852 F.2d 114 (4th
Cir. 1988). See also BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 657 F. Supp. 1246 (C.D. Cal.
1987); Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, 595 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 814 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1987); Woelfer v. Happy States of America, Inc., 626 F. Supp.
499 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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ment.3 The suit was filed against Brown in her individual capacity.4 The
District Court for the Western District of Virginia upheld the state's
eleventh amendment immunity from copyright and patent infringement.5
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's deci-
sion.6 However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court on the issue
of the liability of individual state officials, holding such officials liable and
rejecting their claim of eleventh amendment immunity.7
The rationale of Anderson and other similar cases is predicated on
Atascadero State Hospital and California Department of Mental Health v.
Scanlon.8 In Atascadero, Douglas Scanlon, a graduate student, brought
suit against a state hospital, alleging that the hospital had denied him
employment solely because of his physical handicaps in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.' The United States Supreme Court, in over-
ruling the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision to affirm the district
court's dismissal,' ° held "that Congress may abrogate the States' consti-
tutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its
intention [to do so] unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.""
In Anderson, the Fourth Circuit did not find language in the Copyright
Act of 1976 indicating Congress' intent to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity. 12
The clash between the eleventh amendment and the Copyright Act
of 1976 focuses on a conundrum which is the marrow of the states' rights
issue-how to enforce constitutionally protected rights against the states.
The conundrum was succinctly stated by Justice Shiras:
The Constitution of the United States, with the several amend-
ments thereof, must be regarded as one instrument, all of whose
provisions are to be deemed of equal validity. It would, indeed,
be most unfortunate if the immunity of the individual States
3. Anderson, 852 F.2d at 116.
4. Id.
5. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
6. 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988).
7. Id. at 122. Judge Boyle sharply disagreed with the majority in a dissenting opinion.
Id. at 123.
8. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1988).
10. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp. & Cal. Dept. of Mental Health, 677 F.2d 1271 (9th
Cir. 1982).
11. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
12. Anderson, 852 F.2d at 117.
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from suits by citizens of other States, provided for in the Elev-
enth Amendment, were to be interpreted as nullifying those
other provisions which confer power on Congress to regulate
commerce among the several States, which forbid the States
from entering into any treaty, alliance or confederation, from
passing any bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing
the obligation of contracts, or, without the consent of Congress,
from laying any duty of tonnage, entering into any agreement
or compact with other States, or from engaging in war-all of
which provisions existed before the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, which still exist, and which would be nullified
and made no effect, if the judicial power of the United States
could not be invoked to protect citizens affected by the passage
of state laws disregarding these constitutional limitations.'
3
The conundrum can be minimized by structuring a doctrine of eleventh
amendment immunity which is in consonance with Congress' plenary
powers under article 1. 14 My thesis grounds the consonance in the nature
of Congress' article I powers, which delineates areas where eleventh
amendment immunity is inapplicable. If my thesis is correct, then Con-
gress has the power to create causes of action against the states, the fed-
eral judiciary can enforce the congressional will against the states and the
states are liable for copyright and patent infringement.
My thesis is grounded in the history of the eleventh amendment and
the concept of sovereign immunity which is the soul of the states' rights
issue. Therefore, a brief excursus into the history of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 as it pertains to the concept of sovereignty is neces-
sary. The excursus will focus on The Federalist Papers5 and the writings
of the opponents of the Constitution, the Antifederalists. Once the his-
torical mise en scene has been established, I will explicate the conceptual
foundation for my thesis. Lastly, accepting the flawed reasoning of Atas-
cadero, I will demonstrate that the text of the Copyright Act clearly evi-
dences a congressional intent to waive the states' eleventh amendment
immunity.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS
In February of 1787, the Continental Congress issued a call to the
13. Prout v. Staff, 188 U.S. 537, 543 (1903).
14. Article I, § 1 provides: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
15. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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states to send delegates to Philadelphia to revise the Articles of Confeder-
ation. 16 The progenitor of the Convention of 1787 was a long simmering
feud between the Nationalists, those who wanted a strong national gov-
ernment, and the Federalists, those who wanted a federation of in-
dependent sovereign states. After the Convention of 1787, the
Nationalists, who favored ratification of the Constitution, expropriated
the name "Federalists" for themselves and tagged those who opposed
ratification with the misnomer "Antifederalists."' 17 The Nationalists in-
cluded James Madison, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and Alex-
ander Hamilton. The Antifederalists included Patrick Henry, George
Mason, Elbridge Gerry and Richard Henry Lee."8
The raison d'etre for the Convention of 1787 was the weakness of
the Confederation government. That weakness was linked to the concept
of sovereignty, ultimate political authority with the power to coerce.' 9
The Articles of Confederation made the national government an acolyte
of the states by vesting sovereignty in the Many, the states.2° The Na-
tionalists believed that the dispersal of sovereignty through the Many
was the root of the ineffectiveness of the Confederation government.2'
Madison summarized the Nationalists' position in an essay, Vices of the
Political System of the United States. 22 He severely criticized the state
governments for failing to comply with the requisitions of the Continen-
tal Congress, encroaching on the federal authority and violating treaties
and the law of nations.23
He also criticized the states for "want of uniformity in the laws con-
cerning naturalization & literary property. ' 24 Madison was aware of the
difficulties inventors and authors encountered in colonial times of secur-
16. Resolution of the Continental Congress (Feb. 21, 1787) (reprinted in THE DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 45 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino
eds. 1981)) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
17. Pennsylvania Gazette (Sept. 12, 1787) (reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 16, at 193).
18. A thorough discussion of the Nationalist-Federalist controversy is beyond the scope of
this paper. See M. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DUR-
ING THE CONFEDERATION 1781-1789 (1962).
19. F. H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY (2d ed. 1986).
20. Article II of the Articles of Confederation provided: "Each state retains its sover-
eignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by
this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." ART. OF
CONFED. art. II.
21. M. MEYER, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 57 (1981).
22. J. Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (April 1787) (reprinted in
M. MEYER, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 57-65 (1981)) [hereinafter Madison's Essay].
23. Id. at 59.
24. Id.
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ing protection for their creative works. Noah Webster unsuccessfully at-
tempted to protect his book, A Grammatical Institute of the English
Language in at least six states.25 John Fitch encountered similar difficul-
ties when he tried to protect his invention of the steamboat.26
The Nationalists planned to correct the imbalance of sovereignty at
the Convention as Madison indicated in a pre-Convention letter to
George Washington:
Conceiving that an individual independence of the States is
utterly irreconcilable with their aggregate sovereignty, and that
a consolidation of the whole into one simple republic would be
as inexpedient as it is unattainable, I have sought for some mid-
dle ground, which may at once support a due supremacy of the
national authority, and not exclude the local authorities wher-
ever they can be subordinately useful.
I would propose next that in addition to the present fed-
eral powers [of the Confederation government], the national
Government should be armed with positive and compleat au-
thority in all cases which require uniformity; such as the regu-
lation of trade, including the right of taxing both exports and
imports, [and] the fixing of terms and forms of
naturalization....
Other Nationalists echoed Madison's criticisms of the states. On
June 18, 1787, Hamilton addressed the Convention. He expressed his
opposition to the New Jersey plan, which would have retained the sover-
eignty of the states, because he was "fully convinced[] that no amend-
ment of the Confederation, leaving the States in possession of their
Sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose [for the revision of the
Articles of Confederation]. ' 28 He chastised the states for constantly pur-
suing their "internal interests adverse to those of the whole,"29 and he
criticized their "love of power" and the "ambition of their
demagogues."30
In The Federalist No. 20, Madison and Hamilton restated their op-
position to the diffused sovereignty of the Confederation government:
25. B. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAWS 120
(1967).
26. Id. at 126.
27. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (April 16, 1787) (reprinted in M.
MEYER, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 66-69 (1981)).
28. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 129
(Ohio University Press 1966) [hereinafter MADISON'S NOTES].
29. Id. at 130.
30. Id. at 131.
1989]
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Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are
unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The im-
portant truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present
case isfl that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over
governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistin-
guished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in
practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by
substituting violence in place of the mild and salutary coercion
of the magistracy. 
31
The Antifederalists, who favored states' rights, conceded that the
Articles of Confederation were not working and reluctantly admitted
that the state governments were at least partially responsible. The Fed-
eral Farmer, who was believed to be Richard Henry Lee,32 wrote: "It
must, however, be admitted, that our federal system is defective, and that
some of the state governments are not well administered. . . .,,3 The
Antifederalist minority at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention pre-
pared a report listing the deficiencies in the Confederation government
attributable to the states.34
The Convention of 1787 accepted Madison's Virginia plan with its
strong central government and changed the distribution of sovereignty of
the Articles of Confederation. The federal government was vested with
ultimate sovereignty in certain limited areas and concomitantly with the
power of coercion. By unanimous vote, the Convention made the legisla-
tive acts of the national government and all treaties binding on the
States. 35 Further, all state officials had to swear allegiance to the national
government.36
In the ratification debate, the Nationalists, through The Federalist
Papers, 37 emphasized the plenary authority of the national government in
its sphere of responsibility. In The Federalist No. 51, Madison explained
that the powers of government have been divided between the states and
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 20, at 138 (J. Madison with A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter, ed.
1961) (emphasis in original).
32. 2 H. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 215 (1981).
33. Letters From the Federal Farmer (Oct. 8, 1787) (reprinted in 2 H. STORING, THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 225 (1981)).
34. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania
to Their Constituents, Pennsylvania Packet And Daily Advertiser (Dec. 18, 1787) (reprinted in
3 H. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 145-67 (1981)).
35. See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 28, at 626.
36. Id. at 105.
37. The Supreme Court has stated that great weight should be given to the contemporane-
ous exposition of the Constitution in The Federalist. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 418 (1821); See also Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 280 (1878).
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the federal government.38 In The Federalist No. 39, he wrote that the
idea of a national government involves an "indefinite supremacy over all
persons and things"39 within its plenary powers, although the states have
a "residuary and inviolable sovereignty" in areas outside of the plenary
powers of the national government. 4o
In The Federalist No. 80, Hamilton included within the jurisdiction
of the federal judiciary cases "arising under the Constitution"4 which he
defined as the "restrictions upon the authority of the State legislatures"42
i.e., Congress' article I powers. In The Federalist No. 81, Hamilton dis-
cussed the concept of state sovereignty in relation to the powers of the
Supreme Court. He acknowledged that the states, as sovereigns, are gen-
erally immune from suit. However, "[u]nless, therefore, there is a sur-
render of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with
the States. . .. "' The implication is clear; the states have retained their
immunity except in those cases where they have surrendered it.
The Antifederalists agreed with Madison and Hamilton about the
plenary powers of the federal government in certain areas. Brutus re-
marked that: "This government is to possess absolute and uncontroul-
able power, legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every
object to which it extends .... The government then, so far as it extends,
is a complete one, and not a confederation. . .. "'
The Impartial Examiner stated that "[i]f this constitution should be
adopted, here the sovereignty of America is ascertained and fixed in the
federal body at the same time that it abolishes the present independent
sovereignty of each state."45 The Impartial Examiner continued that:
The natural understanding of all mankind perceives the appar-
ent absurdity arising from such a supposition: since, if the
word means anything at all, it must mean that supreme power,
which must reside somewhere instate; or, in other terms, it is
the united powers of each individual member of the state col-
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961).
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961).
40. Id.
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 479 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961) (emphasis
added).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 487-88.
44. Brutus, To The Citizens of the State of New- York, The New York Journal (Oct. 18,
1789) (reprinted in 2 H. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 365 (1981)).
45. The Impartial Examiner, To The Free People of Virginia, Virginia Independent Exam-
iner (Feb. 20, 1788) (reprinted in 5 H. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 178
(1981)).
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lected and consolidated into one body.46
The issue of the states' sovereign immunity and their ability to sue in
federal court was mentioned in the ratification debates, but only in the
context of suits against the states in their capacity as debtors.47 In the
Virginia debate over ratification, Edmund Randolph stated that the
states should be amenable to suit because it "forces Virginia to pay her
debts."48 Patrick Henry and George Mason vehemently disagreed with
Randolph.49 Madison responded that a state should not be amenable to
suit in federal court and that the Constitution only would allow states to
sue as plaintiffs.50 John Marshall seconded Madison.51 Hamilton, in The
Federalist No. 81, commented on states' power to sue for their debts:
"[T]here is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by the
adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own
debts in their own way.... "52 In the ratification debates, the issue of the
states' ability to sue in federal court focused on the issue of state debts
and not the states' power to sue under the article I powers.
Justices Brennan, T. Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens contend that
the historical evidence just cited reflects a consensus among the founding
fathers that the states would be immune from suit in federal court."
This contention is only partially correct. When viewed in context with
the evidence pertaining to the powers of the federal government and the
Federalists' position on the national government, it appears that there
might have been an agreement that the states would not be subjected to
suit in federal court for their debts. The "agreement" did not encompass
a limitation on the plenary powers of Congress. If it had, then the Feder-
alists would have agreed to a form of confederation government similar
46. Id. (emphasis in original).
47. A paper money faction controlled the legislature of many states. The paper money
forces favored the repudiation of state debts, particularly debts owed to loyalist sympathizers
who, in many cases, had their property seized by the states. The states were particularly upset
about being sued for their debts in federal court because they could defeat suits by their credi-
tors in state courts by relying on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which had been incorpo-
rated into the common law by the monarchist, William Blackstone. See Engdahl, Immunity
And Accountability for Positive Government Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1973). In
Vices of the Political System of the United States, Madison criticized the states for failing to pay
their debts. (reprinted in M. MEYER, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 58-59 (1981)).
48. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 207 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876) [hereinafter DEBATES] (statement of E.
Randolph).
49. DEBATES, supra note 48, at 207, 526-27 (statements of P. Henry and G. Mason).
50. DEBATES, supra note 48, at 319, 533 (statement of J. Madison).
51. DEBATES, supra note 48, at 555-56 (statement of J. Marshall).
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 488 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961).
53. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247-302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to the government under the Articles of Confederation, which is clearly
not the case.
The approval of the Constitution by the people seemingly settled the
Nationalists-Federalists feud. E Pluribus Unum, "from many one" and
the Many had ceded to the One certain plenary powers, including the
power over intellectual property. Madison explained why in The Feder-
alist No. 43: "The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned....
The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individu-
als. The States cannot make effectual provision for either of the cases
[copyright and patent] .... 5'
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Did the passage of the eleventh amendment change the plan of the
Convention of 1787 vis-a-vis sovereignty? This would seem to be the case
if the amendment is a bar to the enforcement of Congress' article I pow-
ers, for without a judicial remedy, Congress would have no means to
coerce compliance.
The history of the eleventh amendment does not support this expan-
sive interpretation. The issue of the states' liability for their debts was
the progenitor of the eleventh amendment. 5  The case of Chisholm v.
Georgia resulted in the enactment of the eleventh amendment. 57 In
Chisholm, two South Carolina citizens brought suit against the State of
Georgia to collect a debt owed an estate. The Supreme Court, applying
article III literally, refused to condition the constitutional grant of au-
thority to the federal courts to adjudicate "[c]ontroversies ... between a
State and Citizens of another state." 58
Chisholm is particularly interesting because the five justices who
composed the Court at the time were Federalists. 59 Two of the justices,
John Blair of Virginia and James Wilson of Pennsylvania, were delegates
to the Convention of 1787. 0 Justices Wilson and Madison were the in-
tellectual theoreticians of the Federalists. The Chief Justice, John Jay,
was one of the authors of The Federalist Papers. The other two justices,
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961).
55. The first suit filed, Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 Dal. 401 (1791), was typical of these
types of suits. In Vanstophorst, two Dutch financiers who had loaned the states and the Conti-
nental Congress large amounts of money during the Revolutionary War, sued to recoup their
loan with interest.
56. 2 DalI. 419 (1793).
57. C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 64-65 (1972).
58. Chisholm, 2 DalI. at 420.
59. C. JACOBS, supra note 57, at 64-65.
60. Id.
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William Cushing of Massachusetts and James Iredell of North Carolina,
argued the Federalists' case for ratification at their state conventions.6'
Justice Iredell was the lone dissenter. He opined that Congress had
not authorized the federal judiciary to hear suits based on assumpsit ac-
tions against the States.62 Justice Iredell argued that since Congress had
not authorized such suits, the common law doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity protected Georgia from Chisholm's claim.63 However, Justice Ire-
dell conceded that the states had surrendered at least part of their
immunity to the national government and that "[t]he United States are
sovereign as to all powers of Government actually surrendered.. 64
The other justices, led by Justices Wilson and Jay, rejected Georgia's
immunity claim.65 Wilson's opinion was a polemic on the inapplicability
of sovereign immunity in a democracy where sovereignty ultimately is
vested in the people.66
As a result of the Chisholm decision, the eleventh amendment was
quickly proposed and passed.67 The amendment passed the Senate 23 to
2, and the House by 81 to 9.68 Ratification was complete by February
1795,69 and on January 8, 1798, President Adams certified that the re-
quired number of States had ratified.7 °
The Federalists overwhelmingly supported the amendment. Why?
Did the Federalists after the long and acrimonious battle for a strong
national government, in the afterglow of victory, decide that the Antifed-
eralists had been right all along? There is not a scintilla of evidence to
support such a conclusion. The key factor in the Federalists' support
were the decisions in Chisholm and the other cases concerning the states'
liability for their debts.7 ' None of the suits impugned the federal judici-
ary's power to enforce article I powers against the states.
At the time of the amendment's passage, the issue of state debts was
being resolved by Hamilton's fiscal program, under which the national
61. Id.
62. Chisholm, 2 Dal]. at 436-37.
63. Id. at 433-35.
64. Id. at 435.
65. Id. at 453-80.
66. Id. at 454-65.
67. C. JACOBS, supra note 57, at 66.
68. Id. at 66.
69. Id. at 67.
70. Id.
71. Justice Story attributed the amendment's passage to the state debt issue. See J.
STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 250
(1986).
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government assumed state debts.72 Thus, the Federalists could support
the amendment with the expectation that there was little likelihood that
the states would be forced into federal court over their debts. No evi-
dence has been uncovered which supports the contention that the sup-
porters of the amendment regarded it as a limitation on Congress' article
I powers or the federal judiciary's power to enforce those powers.
Surely, if the issue had been the article I powers, some of the Federalists
would have raised a hue and cry.
In 1821, when Cohens v. Virginia, 3 a case seeking to impugn the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, came before the Supreme
Court, Chief Justice John Marshall, an ardent Federalist, rejected any
contention that the amendment was a limitation on the federal judici-
ary.74 In his opinion, the Chief Justice also restated the classic Federalist
conception of the Constitution as a limitation on the States' sovereignty:
The general government, though limited as to its objects, is
supreme with respect to those objects .... The powers of the
Union, on the great subjects of war, peace, and commerce, and
so many others, are in themselves limitations of the sovereignty
of the States, but in addition to these, sovereignty is surren-
dered in many instances where surrender can only operate to
the benefit of the people, and, where, perhaps, no other power is
conferred on Congress than a conservative power to maintain
the principles established in the Constitution.
75
Chief Justice Marshall's ruling in Cohens sparked a firestorm among
the advocates of states' rights. Chief Justice Spencer Roane of the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court was livid. Prior to Cohens, Justice Roane sharply
criticized Marshall's ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland 76 in letters to the
Richmond Enquirer." He attacked Chief Justice Marshall's ruling in
Cohens in the same publication, writing under the non de plume of "Al-
gernon Sydney." a7 In both instances, Justice Roane requested the sup-
port of the two Republican sages, Jefferson and Madison. Jefferson
wholeheartedly supported Roane's attacks on Marshall.79
72. J. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 1789-1801, at 33-45 (1960).
73. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
74. Id. at 405-23.
75. Id. at 381-82.
76. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
77. Letters from Spencer Roane to the Editor of the Richmond Enquirer (June 11, 1819,
June 15, 1819, June 18, 1819, June 22 1819) (reprinted in G. GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S
DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland 107-54 (G. Gunther ed.) (1969)).
78. M. MEYER, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 359 (1981).
79. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (March 9, 1821) (reprinted in 15 THE
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However, Madison's replies to Justice Roane are a model of diplo-
macy. He told Roane that the federal government's prerogatives were
not unlimited and that the eleventh amendment "introduces exceptions"
to the power of the federal judiciary to consider suits against the states.80
Madison did not say that Chief Justice Marshall had incorrectly inter-
preted the eleventh amendment in Cohens. Nor did Madison say that the
eleventh amendment, contra to Chief Justice Marshall, barred the federal
judiciary from enforcing the article I powers of Congress.8"
Chief Justice Marshall's rationale in Cohens was accepted by the
national political figures of the era immediately after the amendment's
passage. During this time, states' rights were emerging as the central
political issue. For example, the architect of the states' rights movement,
John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, in The South Carolina Exposition, a
treatise on the Constitution, wrote:
The general powers, expressly delegated to the General Gov-
ernment, are subject to its sole and separate control; and the
States cannot, without violating the constitutional compact, in-
terpose their authority to check, or in any manner to counter-
act its movements, so long as they are confined to the proper
sphere.
8 2
The parameters of the eleventh amendment were further defined
within the context of a state-debt case in Hans v. Louisiana,8 a decided
almost a century after Chisholm. Hans has been cited for the proposition
that the eleventh amendment immunity bars a suit by a state's own citi-
zen for a claim arising under federal law.84 In that case, Hans, a citizen
of Louisiana, brought suit against the state of Louisiana to recover the
amount of certain coupons annexed to bonds of the State, issued under
the provisions of a legislative act.8" Hans alleged that the State violated
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 325 (A. Lipscomb ed.) (Washington, D.C. 1903)). At this
time Jefferson was hostile to the Supreme Court. He told Roane that "[t]he great object of my
fear is the federal judiciary. That body, like gravity, ever acting, with noiseless foot, and
unalarming advance, gaining ground step by step, and holding what it gains, is ingulfing in-
siduously the special governments into the jaws of that which feeds them." Id at 326.
80. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821) (reprinted in M. MEYER,
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 366 (1981)).
81. Letters from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819, May 6, 1821, June 29,
1821) (reprinted in M. MEYER, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 357-69 (1981)).
82. J. Calhoun, The South Carolina Exposition (reprinted in R. CRALLE, 6 THE WORKS OF
JOHN C. CALHOUN 36 (1863)).
83. 134 U.S. 1 (1889).
84. See Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265 (1986); Atascadero State Hosp. and Cal. Dept. of Mental Health v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234 (1985).
85. Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.
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its contract with bondholders by amending its constitution to reallocate
the money collected for the purposes of paying the bond debts to defray
the expenses of the state government.8 6 The United States Supreme
Court held that a state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a federal
circuit court by one of its citizens upon a claim arising under the United
States Constitution or the laws of the United States.
8 7
The history of the amendment and its meaning have aroused consid-
erable interest. Scholars who have examined this issue have reached the
same conclusion-that the amendment was meant to be a limitation on
the power of the federal judiciary to imply private damage remedies
against the states under diversity jurisdiction rather than a restraint on
the exercise of a valid congressional power."'
ANALYSIS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME
The lodestar for a constitutional analysis of the eleventh amendment
in consonance with the scheme of federalism envisioned by the Founding
Fathers is the post-Atascadero 9 case McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary
of State of Illinois,9I in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, cit-
ing Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,9 rejected Illi-
nois' claim of eleventh amendment immunity.92 The Seventh Circuit
held that Congress, acting pursuant to its plenary powers under article I,
can create causes of action enforceable against the states and that the
eleventh amendment did not limit Congress' power to do so, or the
power of the federal courts to entertain suits to enforce the congressional
will.93 The Seventh Circuit discussed Atascadero at length and found
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at 3.
88. See Field, The Eleventh Amendment And Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Con-
gressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978); Also see Nowak,
The Scope of Congressional Power To Create Causes of Action Against State Governments And
The History of the Eleventh And Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1442
(1975); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities In Litigation, Taxation and Regulation: Separa-
tion of Powers Issues In Controversies, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 693-94 (1976); Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1889 (1983).
89. In Atascadero the Court held that Congress can abrogate the states' constitutionally
secured immunity only by unequivocally stating its intention to do so in the statute itself.
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
90. 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1987). McVey Trucking has been followed by the Third Circuit
in U.S. v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987).
91. 469 U.S. 528, 550-52 (1985).
92. McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 320.
93. Id at 316-19.
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that it was not dispositive.94
The Seventh Circuit's analysis began with a comparison between
Congress' article I powers and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
The court concluded that the law is settled that Congress can abrogate
when legislating pursuant to section 5.95 The Seventh Circuit found that
"Article I and [section 5 of] the Fourteenth Amendment are both ple-
nary grants of power to Congress."96 The court rejected the contention
that section 5 granted "ultraplenary" powers to Congress.97 Instead, the
court held that there was no constitutionally significant distinction be-
tween the two plenary grants. 98
The Seventh Circuit also analyzed Hans v. Louisiana.99 Judge
Flaum, writing for the court, noted that Hans was a breach of contract
case and that the Hans Court did not rely on the eleventh amendment in
deciding the case."o Furthermore, the court recognized that the court in
Hans did not reach the issue of whether Congress, acting pursuant to its
plenary powers under article I, can abrogate the states' common law sov-
ereign immunity.101
CONGRESS' POWER TO ELIMINATE STATE'S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
THROUGH THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
A. Waiver and Abrogation
If the article I powers are plenary Congress can abrogate or elimi-
nate the states' immunity. Congress' intent to do so should be assumed
or construed from general language such as the "anyone" is liable provi-
sion of the Copyright Act of 1976.102 The Court has not directly ad-
dressed the issue of Congress' power to abrogate the states' immunity.
However, in Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, the Court assumed that the
power to abrogate exists.10 3 In Goldstein v. California, " the Court rec-
ognized the unlimited scope of Congress' plenary power in copyright:
"[T]he States cannot exercise a sovereign power, which under the Consti-
94. Id. at 324-26.
95. Id. at 319-21.
96. Id. at 315.
97. McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 319.
98. Id. at 316.
99. 134 U.S. 1 (1889).
100. McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 318.
101. Id.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
103. County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S.
226, 252 (1985).
104. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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tution, they have relinquished to the Federal Government for its exclu-
sive exercise."' 10 The Court concluded: "When Congress grants an
exclusive right or monopoly, its effects are pervasive; no citizen or State
may escape its reach."'0 6
Waiver, on the other hand, is a legal fiction in the eleventh amend-
ment context, which has been employed by the Supreme Court to vindi-
cate congressional authority. Waiver is "the intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege."' ' Under the waiver
theory, Congress somehow waives the states' immunity for them.0 8 The
Supreme Court has never satisfactorily explained how Congress can
waive a constitutional right for the states.
B. Analysis Under the Atascadero Decision
Under the court's holding in Atascadero, that "Congress may abro-
gate the states' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal
court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute[,]' "' an analysis of the text of the Copyright Act of 1976
indicates a congressional intent to hold the states liable. Limitations on
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner are set forth in sections 107-
118 of the Act. "o Several of the limitations apply to state activities. Sec-
tion 110(6) allows performance of nondramatic musical works by a "gov-
ernment body" at an agricultural fair without permission of the
copyright owner. 1 ' The state fair exemption also exempts the states
from vicarious liability for copyright infringements by private conces-
sionaires, business establishments, or other persons at state fairs." 2 Ex-
105. Id. at 552.
106. Id. at 560. See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549-50
(1985) (test of congressional power to impose financial burdens on a state is simply whether the
Constitution "has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to
the Federal Government .... [T]he Constitution does not carve out express elements of state
sovereignty that Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace."); County of
Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124, 1128-35 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983)
(Congress can create cause of action against state under its extradition power); Peel v. Florida,
600 F.2d 1070, 1074-82 (5th Cir. 1979) (cause of action under war powers clauses permitted).
107. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
108. Parden v. Terminal Railway Co., 377 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964). See also Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
109. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
110. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1982).
111. 17 U.S.C § 110(6) (1982).
112. Id The "state fair" exemption was designed to protect "a State or any political subdi-
vision thereof." Copyright Law Revision, Hearings on S. 597, Before the Subcomm on Patent,
Trademark and Copyrights, Comm. on Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1967) (letter of Sen.
Frank Lausche).
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ceptions are also provided for the use of copyrighted material by libraries
and archives in section 108; "' certain nondramatic performances by a
"governmental body" '114 under section 110(2)(A);" 5 a secondary cable
transmission by a "governmental body" under section 111 (a)(4);1" 6 and
any use of an ephemeral recording by a "governmental body" under sec-
tions 112(b) and 112(d)(1)." '7 Further limitations on state liability are
found in sections 601 and 602. 18
Nothing in the Copyright Act of 1976 or its legislative history indi-
cates that Congress enacted the exemptions for any other purpose than to
delineate specific instances when the states would be immune from liabil-
ity. The legislative history of the Act is replete with testimony on the
states' use of copyrighted material and, why, in certain instances, liability
should not attach.' 19 If Congress did not intend to waive or abrogate the
states' eleventh amendment immunity, the exceptions noted above are
mere surplusage and Congress wasted enormous amounts of time and
money in a feckless exercise.
Moreover, Congress demonstrated its plenary power over copyright
by abolishing all state protection of copyright 2 ° and mandating that the
federal judiciary have exclusive jurisdiction of suits for copyright in-
fringement. 12 1 The vesting of the federal judiciary with exclusive juris-
diction over all copyright defendants provides additional indicia that
Congress intended the states to be sued in federal court for infringing
activities.
113. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982).
114. It is beyond peradventure that "governmental body" applies to the states. See HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (Comm.
Print, July, 1961) (Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law stating that the law contained "nothing to prevent governmental bodies, at least
of the States [added emphasis] from securing copyright .... ").
Four months prior to the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 the Supreme Court held
that "governments" and "governmental agencies" included the States. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 449, n.2 (1976).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(A) (1982).
116. 17 U.S.C. § Ill(a)(4) (1982).
117. 17 U.S.C. §§ 112(b), 112(d)(l) (1982).
118. 17 U.S.C. §§ 601-602 (1982).
119. See, e.g., Meeting On Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law: Hearings on
HR 4347 HR. 5680, HR. 6831, HR. 6835 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 485-92 (1966) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Eugene N. Aleinikoff, Nat.
Educ. Television & Radio Center).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Congress' intention to "preempt and abolish" all state protec-
tion of copyright is stated in H.R. REP. Doc. No. 94-1476, 94th Congress, 2d Sess. 130-31.
121. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (1982).
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C. Anderson Under the Atscadero Decision
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the foregoing analysis
in Anderson 122 and bypassed the issue of whether Congress can abrogate
eleventh amendment immunity when legislating pursuant to article I.
Instead, the majority focused on the issue of congressional intent to abro-
gate or constructively waive, contending that these "conceptually differ-
ent theories" are subsumed within the issue of congressional intent.
23
This is a horse before the cart approach because if Congress does not
have the power to abrogate, its intention to do so is irrelevant. Judge
Phillips, writing for the majority, found that the test for abrogation and/
or waiver is "a most stringent one, couched deliberately in terms of con-
straints both upon the legislative and the judicial interpretive process."1
24
The constraints are predicated upon "the vital role of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in our federal system.'
125
The majority then proceeded to analyze the Copyright Act in terms
of the Atascadero standard. Judge Phillips concentrated his analysis on
the various exemptions from liability provided for by the Copyright
Act. 126 He concluded that the various exemptions were intended to ap-
ply only to local government units. 127 Judge Phillips ignored the well
documented fact that state government officials testified in favor of the
exemptions in the congressional hearings. 28 Moreover, there is not a
scintilla of evidence from the legislative history or the language of the
statute to support the conclusion of Judge Phillips that the exemptions
were only for the benefit of local government units.
The Anderson court unanimously found that state officials are indi-
vidually liable for copyright infringement. 129 Generally, government offi-
cials who violate constitutional rights can raise a qualified or good faith
immunity defense.' The court, however, rejected any immunity de-
fense for officials who violate the Copyright Act, leaving those officials
with only the defenses provided for in the Copyright Act itself, i.e., fair
use, estoppel, etc."' The court specifically rejected the contention that a
state official is acting in his/her official capacity when handling copyright
122. Anderson, 852 F.2d at 117.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 119-20.
127. Anderson, 852 F.2d at 119.
128. Hearings, supra note 119.
129. Anderson, 852 F.2d at 122.
130. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
131. Anderson, 852 F.2d at 122.
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material for the state. 3 2 The Anderson court stated that "[t]he mere fact
that her conduct was undertaken in the course of her state employment
does not of course relieve her of individual liability, even if her employer
could not be sued for it."' 33 Undoubtedly, Anderson will cause state offi-
cials to think twice before commencing infringing activities, thus lessen-
ing the possibility that states will expropriate intellectual property.
Judge Boyle,' 34 in a well reasoned dissent, found that the "eleventh
amendment cannot be construed so as to 'repeal' article I."L "35 Judge
Boyle stated that the states' sovereign immunity had been diminished
when they ratified the Constitution and was, in effect, subservient to the
sovereignty of the One, the federal government. 36 Judge Boyle con-
cluded that Congress' power to enact copyright legislation, coupled with
the supremacy clause,' 37 overrides whatever subsidiary sovereignty the
states have as a result of the eleventh amendment.
38
Judge Boyle also noted that Congress had expanded liability for
copyright infringement in the Copyright Act of 1976 by changing the
language of Section 501 from imposing liability on "any person" to "any-
one. ' "3 9 Although the change standing alone was not sufficient evidence
of congressional intent to abrogate/waive, the change supplemented by
an analysis of the exemptions to liability were enough to convince Judge
Boyle that Congress intended to abrogate. 14" Judge Boyle concluded
that "to make all of the foregoing exemption provisions applicable only
to local governments is to render nugatory a great volume of work done
by Congress."''
D. Consequences of Anderson
By holding state officials individually liable, the Fourth Circuit was
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Judge Boyle, a district court judge from North Carolina, sat on the court by
designation.
135. Anderson, 852 F.2d at 125.
136. Id.
137. Article VI provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof;... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause is another
example of how the sovereignty of the states was bound by the sovereignty of the federal
government.
138. Anderson, 852 F.2d at 124.
139. Id. at 126.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 129.
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continuing the fiction of Ex Parte Young. 42 In Ex Parte Young, a stock-
holder brought suit against a railroad company and the State Railroad
and Warehouse Commission to prevent the company from complying
with a Minnesota law requiring that railway companies adopt and pub-
lish a specified rate schedule that was below that which the market would
bear.' 43 The plaintiff alleged that the Minnesota laws violated the elev-
enth amendment because the state did not have a pecuniary interest in
the litigation." The Court negotiated an end run around its previous
eleventh amendment rulings, such as in Chisholm, by rationalizing that
state officials who violate federally protected rights are acting ultra vires,
and therefore, the states' sovereign immunity is not tarnished by en-
joining the officials.' 45 Ex Parte Young has been the Supreme Court's
escape hatch from the conceptual box of the constitutionalization of sov-
ereign immunity inherent in the Court's eleventh amendment
jurisprudence.
The Fourth Circuit's rationale in imposing liability on state officials
for copyright infringement is conceptually sound. The Copyright Act
provides liability for "anyone" who infringes.' 46 The starting point for
the interpretation of a statute is the language of the statute. Thus, "any-
one" means anyone including state officials. The liability of all who par-
ticipate in the infringement is settled.'47 Moreover, the violation of a
copyright is not a spur-of-the-moment tort. Unlike the policeman who
often must make an instantaneous decision which may violate constitu-
tional rights, the putative infringer has time for reflection and inquiry.
The copyright notice alerts the putative infringer that the material is fed-
erally protected. Lastly, the Copyright Act has incorporated good faith
142. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
143. Id. at 129.
144. Id. at 138.
145. Id. at 168. In Penhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984),
the Supreme Court further muddied the waters of eleventh amendment jurisprudence by re-
treating from the rationale of Ex Parte Young. Justices Stevens, Marshall, Brennan, and
Blackmun in dissent criticized the majority for denying injunctive relief against an official who
violates state law as inconsistent with Ex Parte Young. Justice Powell, writing for the majority
questioned the "continued vitality of the ultra vires doctrine in the Eleventh Amendment con-
text." Id. at 114, n.25. See also, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189-95 (2d ed.
1988).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1982).
147. See 3 M. NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04, at 12-35 (1987). See also
Stabilisierungfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Dist. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 207 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) ("Courts have long held in patent, trademark, literary property, and copyright
cases, that any member of the distribution chain can be sued as an alleged tortfeasor");
Gilbourne and Meyer, Liability For Copyright Infringement Committed by Third Parties or by
Employees, 2 COMPUTER LAWYER No. 4, at 1 (1985).
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in the "fair use" defense which exculpates putative infringers from
liability. 
1 48
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court must define the eleventh amendment's place in
a system of federalism which not only recognizes the limited sovereignty
of the states, but vindicates the federally protected rights of individuals
against the states. The conceptual foundation for such a doctrine can be
grounded in Congress' plenary powers under article I, which delineates
areas of uniquely national interests such as foreign affairs, postal services,
copyright and patent, and immigration, etc. A doctrine grounded in the
article I powers would be consistent with the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution who recognized the need for a One, supreme in areas of
national interests while allocating to a Many responsibilities in areas
which are uniquely local.
POSTSCRIPT
While Anderson was under consideration by the Fourth Circuit, the
Register of Copyrights completed a study on the relationship of copy-
right and the eleventh amendment, undertaken at the request of Repre-
sentatives Robert Kastenmeier and Carlos Moorhead of the House
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Jus-
tice. 49 The Register concluded that Congress intended the states to be
liable for copyright infringement.' 50 The Register recommends that
Congress amend section 501 of the Copyright Act to clearly state the
congressional intention that "anyone" includes the states.' The Regis-
ter prefers a legislative solution to the problem "since this action would
merely confirm Congress' original intent about the states' amenability to
damage suits under the federal Copyright Act."' 5 2
148. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). See also W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPY-
RIGHT LAW (1985).
149. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT LIABILITY OF STATES AND THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT (1988).
150. Id at vii.
151. Id at ix.
152. Id
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